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BITCOIN SELFISH MINING AND DYCK WORDS
CYRIL GRUNSPAN AND RICARDO PE´REZ-MARCO
Abstract. We give a straightforward proof for the formula giving the long-term
apparent hashrate of the Selfish Mining strategy in Bitcoin using only elementary
probabilities and combinatorics, and more precisely, Dyck words. There is no need
to compute stationary probabilities on Markov chain nor stopping times for Poisson
processes as it was previously done. We consider also several other block withholding
strategies.
1. Introduction
Selfish mining (in short SM) is a particular non-stop strategy of block withholding
strategy described in [1] which exploits a flaw in the Bitcoin protocol in the difficulty
adjustment formula [4]. The strategy is made of attack cycles. During each attack
cycle, the attacker adds blocks to a secret fork and then, broadcasts them to peers
with an appropriate timing. This is a deviant strategy from the Bitcoin protocol since
an honest miner never withholds blocks and always mines on top of the last block of
the official blockchain [3].
As explained in [4] the good objective function based on sound economics principles
in order to compare profitabilities of mining strategies with repetition is the revenue
ratio E[R]E[T ] where R is the revenue of the miner per attack cyle and T is the duration
time per cycle. After a difficulty adjustment, this mean duration time becomes equal
to E[L] · τB where L is the number of blocks added to the official blockchain by the
network per attack cycle and τB = 600 sec. [6]. Thus, the objective function becomes
proportional to the long-term apparent hashrate of the strategy q˜ = E[Z]E[L] where Z
is the number of blocks added by the attacker to the official blockchain per attack
cycle. Several methods have been conceived to compute q˜. In [1], first a stationary
probability is computed for a Markov chain. In [4] we use martingale techniques
and consider Poisson processes and associated stopping times. The revenue ratio is
then computed at once using Doob’s stopping time theorem. This last method has
the advantage to fit the correct profitability analysis, and to identify the source of
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the weakness of the protocol. It allows a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) to
prevent the attack. It also yields the mean duration time before the attack becomes
profitable. This last fact is out of reach with pure Markov chain models.
As usual, the relative hashrate of the honest miners (resp. attacker) is p (resp. q)
and γ denotes its “connectivity”. We have p + q = 1, q < 1
2
and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. We
consider that whenever a competition occurs between two blocks or two forks, there
is a fraction γ of the honest miners who mines on top of a block validated by the
attacker.
2. Attack cycle and Dyck word
An attack cycle for the SM strategy can be described as a sequence X0 . . . Xn with
Xi ∈ {S,H}. The index i indicates the i-th block validated since the beginning of
the cycle and letters S,H determine the miner who has discovered this block between
the selfish miner (S) and the honest miners (H).
Example 2.1. The sequence SSSHSHH means that the selfish miner has first vali-
dated three blocks in a row, then the honest miners have mined one, then the selfish
miner has validated a new one and finally the honest miners have mined two blocks.
At this point, the advantage of the selfish miner is only of one block. So according
to the SM strategy, he decides to publish his whole fork and ends his attack cycle. In
that case, we have L = Z = 4.
We are interested in the distribution of L.
Theorem 2.2. We have P[L = 1] = p,P[L = 2] = pq + pq2 and for n > 3, P[L =
n] = pq2(pq)n−2Cn−2 where Cn =
(2n)!
n!(n+1)!
is the n-th Catalan number.
Proof. For n > 3, we note that {L = n} is a collection of sequences of the form w =
SSX1 · · ·X2(n−2)H with Xi ∈ {S,H} for all i, such that if S and H are respectively
replaced by the brackets “(“ and “)” then, X1 · · ·X2(n−2) is a Dyck word (i.e., balanced
parentheses) with length 2(n − 2) (see [2]). The number of letters “S” (resp. “H”)
in w is n (resp. n− 1). So, we get P[L = n] = pn−1qnCn−2 (see [2]). Finally, we note
that {L = 1} = {H}, {L = 2} = {SSH, SHS, SHH}. Hence we get the result. 
Corollary 2.3. We have E[L] = 1 + p
2q
p−q
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Proof. It comes from the well know relations∑
n>0
p(pq)nCn = 1(1) ∑
n>0
np(pq)nCn =
q
p− q(2)
that have been already used and proved in [5]. 
We can now compute the apparent hashrate.
Theorem 2.4. The long-term apparent hashrate of the selfish miner in Bitcoin is
q˜B =
[(p− q)(1 + pq) + pq]q − (p− q)p2q(1− γ)
pq2 + p− q
Proof. If L > 3, then we are in the cases where all blocks validated by the selfish
miner will end in the official blockchain. So, Z = L. If L = 1, then Z = 0. Moreover,
Z(SSH) = Z(SHS) = 2 and Z(SHH) = 0 (resp. 1) with probability 1 − γ (resp. γ).
So,
E[Z] = E[L]− p− p2qγ − 2p2q(1− γ)
= E[L]− (p+ p2q + p2q(1− γ))
Using Corollary 2.3 we get:
E[Z]
E[L]
=
p2q + p− q − (p− q)(p+ p2q + p2q(1− γ))
pq2 + p− q
=
[(p− q)(1 + pq) + pq]q − (p− q)p2q(1− γ)
pq2 + p− q
This is nothing but Proposition 4.9 from [4] which is itself another form of Formula
(8) from [1]. 
3. Stubborn Mining
We consider now two other block witholding strategies described in [7]. In the se-
quel, C(x) = 1−
√
1−4x
2x
denotes the generating series for the Catalan numbers (Cn)n>0.
3.1. Equal Fork Stubborn Mining. In this strategy, the attacker never tries to
override the official blockchain but when it is possible, he broadcasts the part of his
secret fork sharing the same height as the official blockchain as soon as the honest
miners publish a new block. The attack cycle ends when the attacker has been
caught up and overtaken by the honest miners by one block [5, 7]. We show that the
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distribution of L− 1 is what we have called a (p, q)-Catalan distribution of first type
in [5].
Theorem 3.1. We have ∀n ∈ N,P[L = n+ 1] = p(pq)nCn.
Proof. Indeed, for n ∈ N, {L = n + 1} is a collection of sequences of the form
w = X1 · · ·X2nH with Xi ∈ {S,H} for all i, such that if S and H are respectively
replaced by the brackets “(“ and “)” then, X1 · · ·X2n is a Dyck word with length
2n. 
Corollary 3.2. We have E[L] = p
p−q
Proof. Obvious by (1) and (2). 
Theorem 3.3. The long-term apparent hashrate of a miner following the Equal-Fork
Stubborn Mining strategy is given by q˜ = q
p
− (1−γ)(p−q)
γp
(1− pC((1− γ)pq)).
Proof. In an attack cycle, all the honest blocks except the last one have a probability
γ to be replaced by the attacker. So, E[Z|L = n+1] = n+1− 1−(1−γ)n+1
γ
. See Lemma
B.1 [5]. Conditionning by {L = n+ 1} for n ∈ N and using Theorem 3.1, we then get
E[Z] =
q
p− q −
1− γ
γ
(1− pC((1− γ)pq))
Hence we get the result. 
3.2. Lead Stubborn Mining. The strategy looks like the selfish mining strategy but
here, the attacker takes the risk of being caught up by the honest miners. When this
happens, there is a final competition between two forks sharing the same height. Once
the competition is resolved, a new attack cycles starts. In this case, the distribution
of L− 1 is what we have called a (p, q)-Catalan distribution of second type [5].
Theorem 3.4. We have P[L = 1] = p and for n > 1, P[L = n+ 1] = (pq)nCn−1.
Proof. Indeed, we have {L = 1} = {H} and for n ∈ N, {L = n + 1} is a collection
of sequences of the form w = SX1 · · ·X2(n−1)HY with X1, . . . , X2(n−1), Y ∈ {S,H}
and such that if S and H are respectively replaced by the brackets “(“ and “)” then,
X1 · · ·X2(n−1) is a Dyck word with length 2(n− 1). 
Corollary 3.5. We have E[L] = p−q+pq
p−q
Proof. Obvious by (1) and (2). 
By repeating the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 for the computation
of E[Z], we obtain the following theorem [5].
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Theorem 3.6. The long-term apparent hashrate of a miner following the Lead Stub-
born Mining strategy is given by q˜ = q(p+pq−q
2)
p+pq−q − pq(p−q)(1−γ)γ · 1−p(1−γ)C((1−γ)pq)p+pq−q
We color the region (q, γ) ∈ [0, 0.5] × [0, 1] according to which strategy is more
profitable, and we obtain Figure 1 [5] (HM is the honest mining strategy).
HM SM
LSM −→
EFSM
Figure 1. Dominance regions in parameter space (q, γ).
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